1. The theory of managerial firms : setting the stage -- 2. Strategic delegation in oligopoly -- 3. Mixed oligopolies -- 4. Collusive behaviour and horizontal mergers -- 5. Divisionalization and vertical relations -- 6. Innovation and technical progress -- 7. Endogenous product differentiation...

We study the product and process innovation choice of firms in which a managerial incentive à la Vickers (1985) is present. Taking a two-stage dynamic game approach, we show that managerial firms are led to over-invest in process innovation, as compared to standard profit-maximising firms,...

The stability of collusion is analysed for a family of demand functions whose curvature is determined by a parameter varying between zero and infinity. When the number of firms is low, firms may prefer to act as quantity setters in order to increase cartel stability if demand is sufficiently...

<marquage typemarq="gras"/> We investigate positional effects in a vertically differentiated duopoly, evaluated against the first best. Positional concerns distort the allocation of consumers across varieties, as well as the average quality. If the external effect is sufficiently relevant, the resulting welfare loss is...

With reference to Lambertini (2003), Lin correctly points out that, if R&D efforts for process innovation are endogenous, then process and product R&D are strategic complements. Then, he also proves that the opposite holds when spillovers are nil. Objecting to Lin's second claim, I show that...

The monopolist's incentives towards product and process innovations are evaluated against the social optimum. The main findings are that (i) the incentive to invest in cost-reducing R&D is inversely related to the number of varieties being supplied at equilibrium, under both regimes&semi; (ii)...

We investigate the behavior of a monopolist supplying a vertically differentiated good with network externalities. Assuming a convex unit cost of quality improvements, we show that the presence of network externalities may yield oversupply of quality compared with the social optimum, when...