This paper studies the costs and benefits of delegating decisions to superiorly informed agents relative to the use of rigid, non discretionary contracts. Delegation grants some flexibility in the choice of the action by the agent, but also requires the use of an appropriate incentive contract...

We show, in the Choquet expected utility model, that preference for diversification, that is, convex preferences, is equivalent to a concave utility index and a convex capacity. We then introduce a weaker notion of diversification, namely ``sure diversification.'' We show that this implies that...

We provide a model of decision making under uncertainty in which the decision maker reacts toimprecision of the available data. Data is represented by a set of probability distributions. Weaxiomatize a decision criterion of the maxmin expected utility type, in which the revealed setof priors...

The author develops a simple example of a model in which agents have asymmetric information and preferences that are represented by a nonadditive expected utility function. The a priori uninformed agent, after observing the equilibrium price, has conditional beliefs that remain nonadditive....

This paper analyzes through a simple two-period model the fact that, if some agents hold inside money intertemporally, the second-period "normalization" matters. Thus, there are several equilibria of the second-period economy, indexed by the level of inflation. A concept of equilibrium...