Experimental evidence suggests that agents in social dilemmas have belief-dependent, other-regarding preferences. But in experimental games such preferences cannot be common knowledge, because subjects play with anonymous co-players. We address this issue theoretically and experimentally in the...

In the theory of psychological games it is assumed that players' preferences on material consequences depend on endogenous beliefs. Most of the applications of this theoretical framework assume that the psychological utility functions representing such preferences are common knowledge. But this...

Experimental evidence suggests that agents in social dilemmas have belief-dependent, other-regarding preferences. But in experimental games such preferences cannot be common knowledge, because subjects play with anonymous co-players. We address this issue theoretically and experimentally in the...

In the theory of psychological games it is assumed that players preferences on material consequences depend on endogenous beliefs. Most of the applications of this theoretical framework assume that the psychological utility functions representing such preferences are common knowledge. But this...

Frustration, anger, and aggression have important consequences for economic and social behavior, concerning for example monopoly pricing, contracting, bargaining, tra¢ c safety, violence, and politics. Drawing on insights from psychology, we develop a formal approach to exploring how...

Our recent research emphasizes the importance of information feedback in situations of recurrent decisions and strategic interaction, showing how it affects the uncertainty that underlies selfconfi?rming equilibrium. Here we discuss in detail the properties of such a key feature of recurrent...