We conduct an experiment on price competition in a segmented market. Each segment contains one seller and one consumer, and consumers incur transportation costs when they buy from a seller located in another segment. We observe persistent price dispersion in our experimental markets with the...

This paper presents theory and experiments to investigate how network architecture influences route-choice behavior by comparing outcomes across several different networks. The network changes we consider are based on abstract examples illustrating the Pigou-Knight-Downs and Braess Paradoxes. We...

In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good, embedding Varian (1994)’s voluntary contribution game in extended games that allow players to choose the timing of their contributions. We show that predicted outcomes are sensitive to the structure of the extended game, and...

We investigate the effects of pay comparison information (i.e. information about what coworkers earn) and effort comparison information (information about how co-workers perform) in experimental firms composed of one employer and two employees. Exposure to pay comparison information in isolation...

We investigate experimentally the effect of consultation (unincentivized advice) on choices under risk in an incentivized investment task. We compare these choices to two benchmark treatments: one with isolated individual choices, and a second with group choice after communication. Our...

Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may affect the balance of power between the original members even if their number of votes and the decision rule remain constant. Some of the original members may actually gain, a phenomenon known as the paradox of new members. We...

We compare social preference and social norm based explanations for peer effects in a three-person gift-exchange game experiment. In the experiment a principal pays a wage to each of two agents, who then make effort choices sequentially. In our baseline treatment we observe that the second...

Many important decisions are taken according to weighted majority rule. Power indices predict that enlargement of the voting body may affect the balance of power between the original members even if their number of votes and the decision rule remain constant. Some of the existing voters may...

We present an experiment investigating why contributions decline in repeated public goods games. To distinguish between alternative explanations for this decrease we use a strategy method to elicit strategies in a simple two-stage public goods game. By repeating the game with new opponents...

We examine the characteristics of effective leaders in a simple leader-follower voluntary contributions game. We focus on two factors: the individual’s cooperativeness and the individual’s beliefs about the cooperativeness of others. We find that groups perform best when led by those who are...