Based on an extension of the controlled Markov set-chain model by Kurano et al. (in J Appl Prob 35:293–302, 1998) into competitive two-player game setting, we provide a model of perfect information two-person zero-sum Markov games with imprecise transition probabilities. We define an...

Based on an extension of the controlled Markov set-chain model by Kurano et al. (in J Appl Prob 35:293–302, 1998) into competitive two-player game setting, we provide a model of perfect information two-person zero-sum Markov games with imprecise transition probabilities. We define an...

We develop an isotone recursive approach to the problem of existence, computation, and characterization of nonsymmetric locally Lipschitz continuous (and, therefore, Clarke-differentiable) Markovian equilibrium for a class of infinite horizon multiagent competitive equilibrium models with...

We develop an isotone recursive approach to the problem of existence, computation, and characterization of nonsymmetric locally Lipschitz continuous (and, therefore, Clarke-differentiable) Markovian equilibrium for a class of infinite horizon multiagent competitive equilibrium models with...

This paper studies stationary Markov perfect equilibria in multidimensional models of dynamic bargaining, in which the alternative chosen in one period determines the status quo for the next. We generalize a sufficient condition for existence of equilibrium due to Anesi and Seidmann, 2015. We...

We develop an isotone recursive approach to the problem of existence, computation, and characterization of nonsymmetric locally Lipschitz continuous (and, therefore, Clarke-differentiable) Markovian equilibrium for a class of infinite horizon multiagent competitive equilibrium models with...

We develop an isotone recursive approach to the problem of existence, computation, and characterization of nonsymmetric locally Lipschitz continuous (and, therefore, Clarke-differentiable) Markovian equilibrium for a class of infinite horizon multiagent competitive equilibrium models with...

This paper studies stationary Markov perfect equilibria in multidimensional models of dynamic bargaining, in which the alternative chosen in one period determines the status quo for the next. We generalize a sufficient condition for existence of equilibrium due to Anesi and Seidmann, 2015. We...