We examine an entry-deterrence model with multiple incumbents who strategically increase their individual appropriation in order to prevent entry. We find that, as the number of incumbents increases entry deterence can only be supported if the resource is abundant. Additionally, we show that...

This paper evaluates the welfare benefits of introducing environmental regulation in a market that is subject to the threat of entry. We consider complete and incomplete information settings, where potential entrants use the regulator’s tax policy and the incumbent’s output decisions in...

This paper investigates under which conditions governments strategically commit to stringent environmental policies in order to protect domestic markets from entry. We compare social welfare under two policy regimes: a ?exible and in?exible environmental policy. We show that commitment becomes...

This paper investigates the effect of monopoly subsidies on entry deterrence. We consider a potential entrant who observes two signals: the subsidy set by the regulator and the output level produced by the incumbent firm. We show that not only an informative equilibrium can be supported, where...

This paper analyzes the negotiation of a non-binding treaty where agents are uninformed about each others?ability to comply with the terms of the agreement. We show that the presence of incomplete information allows the treaty to become successful under larger set of parameter conditions than...

This paper examines the two externalities that a country's environmental regulation imposes on other country's welfare: an environmental externality, due to transboundary pollution, and a competitive advantage externality, as regulations affect domestic firms' abatement costs, which impact the...

This paper investigates a signaling entry deterrence model under learning-by-doing. We show that a monopolist’s practice of entry deterrence imposes smaller welfare losses (or larger welfare gains) when learning effects are present than when they are absent, making the intervention of...

This paper analyzes the protection of a common pool resource (CPR) through the manage- ment of information. Speci?cally, we examine an entry deterrence model between an incumbent perfectly informed about the initial stock of a CPR and an uninformed potential entrant. In our model, the...

This paper examines firms? incentives to develop a new (green) product,which might compete against the traditional pollutant (brown) product that the? firm sells. We show that in equilibrium more than one?firm might develop the green good, but such an equilibrium outcome is not necessarily...

This paper investigates the signaling role of tax policy in promoting or hindering the ability of a monopolist to practice entry deterrence. We study contexts in which tax policy is Flexible and inflexible. We show that not only an informative equilibrium can be supported where information is...