We provide a simple and intuitive set of axioms that allow for a direct and constructive proof of the Choquet Expected Utility representation for decision making under uncertainty.

We examine a dynamic model of English auctions with independent private values. There is a single object for sale and it is not possible for the seller, who has a value of zero for the object, to commit not to sell in the future if a sale is not accomplished today. The seller may be able to...

We confront two common objections to Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem: one to do with 'fairness', and the other to do with different individuals' having different attitudes toward risk. Both these objections can be accommodated if we drop the reduction axiom: in particular, if we...

The concept of a non-extreme-outcome-additive capacity (neo-additive capacity ) is introduced. Neo-additive capacities model optimistic and pessimistic attitudes towards uncer-tainty as observed in many experimental studies. Moreover, neo-additive capacities can be applied easily in economic...

We compare the Skiadas approach with the standard Savage framework of choice under uncertainty. At first glance, properties of Skiadas "conditional preferences" such as coherence and disappointment seem analogous to similarly motivated notions of decomposability and disappointment aversion...

We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a dynamically consistent agent always to prefer more informative signals (in single-agent problems). These conditions do not imply recursivity, reduction or independence. We provide a simple definition of dynamically consistent behavior, and we...

This paper contains an analysis of a simple principal-agent problem illustrating possible problems that arise when the principal ascribes to the agent subjective probabilities and utilities that are implied by the subjective expected utility model but do not represent the agent's beliefs and...