This paper provides characterization theorems for preferences that can be represented by the minimum, the maximum, and the sum of components, or combinations of these forms. It contains a discussion of applications to social choice

We conduct an analysis of the “efficiency gap” using tools from economic theory and find serious flaws in the measure. In particular, we show that the efficiency gap contains an peculiar form of cost benefit analysis which is hard to defend, that the recommendations for the use of the...

This paper studies lying. An agent randomly picks a number from a known distribution. She can then report any number and receive a monetary payoff based only on her report. The paper presents a model of lying costs that generates hypotheses regarding behavior. In an experiment, we find that the...

This paper studies lying in a simple framework. An agent first randomly picks a number from a known distribution. She can then claim to have observed any number from the set, receiving a monetary payoff based only on her report. Consistent with previous findings, our participants do not...

This chapter presents some of the main developments in the theory of market signaling and its connection to noncooperative game theory. One of the most important applications of game theory to micro-economics has been in the domain of market signaling. The standard story is a simple one: for...

This paper studies equilibrium refinements in signaling games through an examination of rationalizability in derived games obtained by replacing the equilibrium path with a sure outcome that yields the equilibrium payoff to all players. The informed player chooses between the sure payoff and...