We extend the model of insecure property rights by Tornell and Velasco (1992) and Tornell and Lane (1999) by adding three features: (i) extracting the common property asset involves a private appropriation cost, (ii) agents derive utility from wealth as well as from consumption, and (iii) agents...

We study the delegation of climate policy to a supranational environmental authority. We demonstrate that the authority faces a dynamic inconsistency problem that leads to welfare losses. The losses can be kept small if the mandate of the authority penalizes the local cost of emissions heavily,...

We develop a model that incorporates salient features of growth in modern economies. We combine the expanding-variety growth model through horizontal innovations with a hierarchy of basic and applied research. The former extends the knowledge base, while the latter commercializes it. Two-way...

In the framework of a standard overlapping generations model, it is shown that active inflation forecast targeting reinforces mechanisms that lead to indeterminacy of the monetary steady state and to countercyclical behavior of young-age consumption. The inflation forecast targeting rule which...

This paper surveys the literature on cyclical and chaotic equilibrium paths in deterministic optimal growth models with infinitely lived agents. We focus on discrete time models but also briefly mention results for continuous time models. We start by reviewing those results that have been proved...

This paper studies a deterministic one-sector growth model with a constant returns to scale production function and endogenous labor supply. It is shown that the distribution of capital among the agents has an effect on the level of per-capita output. There exists a continuum of stationary...

We extend the model from Tornell and Velasco [13] and Tornell and Lane [12] by adding three features: (i) extracting the common property asset involves a private appropriation cost, (ii) agents derive utility from wealth as well as from consumption, and (iii) agents can be heterogeneous. We show...