We conduct multi-person one-shot ultimatum games that reflect important aspects of collective bargaining. In all treatments a proposer has to divide a pie among herself and six recipients that are divided into two groups of three. The proposer cannot discriminate among, but across group members....

This paper explores whether tax planning by households is consistent with a minimization of the family tax burden or whether and to what extent altruism and concerns about the tax loss of individual household members matter. To this end, we take advantage of a specific feature of the German tax...

We conduct multi-person one-shot ultimatum games that reflect important aspects of collective bargaining. In all treatments a proposer has to divide a pie among herself and two groups of three recipients each. She cannot discriminate within, but across groups. A committee with representatives...

In Binary Threshold Public Good (BTPG) games players contribute or not to the production of a public good which is produced if and only if there are "enough" contributors. There is a plethora of equilibria in BTPG games. We experimentally test general theoretical attributes of equilibria and...

In a laboratory experiment we investigate inter-generational concerns and myopia in a dynamic Public Good game. Groups of four played a 15-period game where they could either invest in a green sector or in a more profitable brown sector that builds a pollution stock. We find that subjects are...

Empirische Studien weisen darauf hin, dass der Gender Wage Gap – die geschlechtsspezifische Lohnlücke – im Tarifbereich geringer als im nichttarifgebundenen Bereich der Wirtschaft ausfällt. Dennoch ist es eine weitgehend offene Frage, wie sich die Strukturen und der Ablauf von...

Der Beitrag untersucht mit LIAB-Daten für die Jahre 2000 bis 2010, wie sich der Gender Pay Gap bei Vollzeitbeschäftigten im Zeitablauf entwickelt hat. Dabei wird zwischen dem nicht-tarifgebundenen Bereich der Wirtschaft und dem Bereich mit Flächentarifverträgen differenziert. Die Befunde...

This paper studies public goods provision in an experiment in which contributors repeatedly interact with rent-extracting administrators. Our main result is that the presence of an administrator reduces contributions but only because rent extraction lowers the MPCR. Analysing the dynamic...

We present controlled experimental evidence on how rent extraction by an administrator affects giving to non-profit associations. Holding the price of giving constant, we compare contributions between two conditions: a rent extraction condition, in which an administrator can expropriate a part...

A common finding of the literature on dishonesty is that groups are more dishonest than individuals. We revisit this finding by making explicit the third-party harmed by subjects' dishonesty: a local charity. With this explicit third-party, we do not find groups to be more dishonest than...