This paper considers cooperative game theoretic settings in which forming coalitions can act as Stackelberg leaders. We de�fine a value function which modi�fies the gamma-value function (Hart & Kurz, 1983, Chander & Tulkens, 1997) by letting members of deviating coalitions move �first in...

We construct a political economy model to analyze the political acceptability of road pricing policies. We use a citizen-candidate framework with a population composed by three groups differing for their income level. We show that road pricing policies are never applied when there is no...

This paper revisits a particular norm of behaviour underlying the well known model of kinked demand. We show that under some standard regularity conditions this norm of behaviour sustains the efficient outcome in all symmetric games.

This paper studies the stability of coordination between mission-driven non-governmental organizations (NGOs) competing for donations. We build a non-cooperative game-theoretic model of alliance formation between NGOs that compete through fundraising activities and impose externalities on each...

This paper investigates the issue of political feasibility of a road pricing policies (RPP). Referring to a literature developed in international trade theory (Fernandez and Rodrick, 1991), this paper presents a model regarding the role and relevance of individual specific uncertainty in...

An argument often adopted to explain the relatively scarce presence of Producer Co-operatives (PCs) in Western capitalist economies is the instability that may affect this type of firm during the positive phases of the business cycle. In a nutshell the argument is that in profitable industries...

This paper examines the forecasting approach of foreign trade unit value indices followed in the compilation of quarterly national accounts of Italy. Total imports and exports indices are indirectly obtained from the aggregation of ARIMA forecasts of disaggregated components, derived from the...

In many strategic settings comparing the payo¤s obtained by players under full cooperation to those obtainable at a sequential (Stackelberg) equilibrium can be crucial to determine the final outcome of the game. This happens, for instance, in repeated games in which players can break...