This is a brief survey describing some of the recent progress and open problems in the area of cooperative games with incomplete information. We discuss exchange economies, cooperative Bayesian games with orthogonal coalitions, and issues of cooperation in noncooperative Bayesian games.

According to a minimalist version of Afriat’s theorem, a consumer behaves as a utility maximizer if and only if a feasibility matrix associated with his choices is cyclically consistent. An “essential experiment” consists of observed consumption bundles <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$(x_{1}, \ldots , x_{n})$$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> and a...</equationsource></inlineequation>

We survey some recent results on implementation of competitive solutions in differential economies. Extending to this context Arrow and Debreu’s definitions raises many conceptual issues. For instance, some properties of rational expectations equilibria may appear as paradoxical. In order to...

A mistake in “Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information” motivates a re-examination of some extensions of the solution concept that Aumann introduced.

In a differential information economy with quasi-linear utilities, monetary transfers facilitate the fulfillment of incentive compatibility constraints: the associated ex ante core is generically non-empty. However, we exhibit a wellbehaved exchange economy in which this core is empty, even if...