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Coordination Games and Local Interactions: A Survey of the Game Theoretic Literature

Weidenholzer, Simon - In: Games 1 (2010) 4, pp. 551-585

local interactions. Amongst others, we discuss best reply learning in a global- and in a local- interaction framework and … best reply learning in multiple location models and in a network formation context. Further, we discuss imitation learning …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008756384

Coordination Games on Dynamical Networks

Tomassini, Marco; Pestelacci, Enea - In: Games 1 (2010) 3, pp. 242-261

We propose a model in which agents of a population interacting according to a network of contacts play games of coordination with each other and can also dynamically break and redirect links to neighbors if they are unsatisfied. As a result, there is co-evolution of strategies in the population...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008682969

Local Interaction on Random Graphs

Berninghaus, Siegfried; Haller, Hans - In: Games 1 (2010) 3, pp. 262-285

We analyze dynamic local interaction in population games where the local interaction structure (modeled as a graph) can change over time: A stochastic process generates a random sequence of graphs. This contrasts with models where the initial interaction structure (represented by a deterministic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008682991

Learning in Networks—An Experimental Study Using Stationary Concepts

Berninghaus, Siegfried K.; Neumann, Thomas; Vogt, Bodo - In: Games 5 (2014) 3, pp. 140-159

Our study analyzes theories of learning for strategic interactions in networks. Participants played two of the 2 × 2 …, payoff-sampling equilibrium, and impulse balance equilibrium) which represent the long-run equilibrium of a learning process …. Secondly, we relate our results to four different learning models (impulse-matching learning, action-sampling learning, self …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011030494

Bounded Memory, Inertia, Sampling and Weighting Model for Market Entry Games

Chen, Wei; Liu, Shu-Yu; Chen, Chih-Han; Lee, Yi-Shan - In: Games 2 (2011) 1, pp. 187-199

This paper describes the “Bounded Memory, Inertia, Sampling and Weighting” (BI-SAW) model, which won the http://sites.google.com/site/gpredcomp/Market Entry Prediction Competition in 2010. The BI-SAW model refines the I-SAW Model (Erev et al. [1]) by adding the assumption of limited memory...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009025196

Market Entry Prediction Competition 2010

Hariskos, Wasilios; Leder, Johannes; Teodorescu, Kinneret - In: Games 2 (2011) 2, pp. 200-208

We submitted three models to the competition which were based on the I-SAW model. The models introduced four new assumptions. In the first model an adjustment process was introduced through which the tendency for exploration was higher at the beginning and decreased over time in the exploration...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009025198

A Model of Protocoalition Bargaining with Breakdown Probability

Montero, Maria - In: Games 6 (2015) 2, pp. 39-56

This paper analyses a model of legislative bargaining in which parties form tentative coalitions (protocoalitions) before deciding on the allocation of a resource. Protocoalitions may fail to reach an agreement, in which case they may be dissolved (breakdown) and a new protocoalition may form....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011265463

Acknowledgement to Reviewers of <i>Games</i> in 2014

Games Editorial Office - In: Games 6 (2015) 1, pp. 1-1

The editors of <i>Games</i> would like to express their sincere gratitude to the following reviewers for assessing manuscripts in 2014:[...]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011114940

Selection-Mutation Dynamics of Signaling Games

Hofbauer, Josef; Huttegger, Simon M. - In: Games 6 (2015) 1, pp. 2-31

We study the structure of the rest points of signaling games and their dynamic behavior under selection-mutation dynamics by taking the case of three signals as our canonical example. Many rest points of the replicator dynamics of signaling games are not isolated and, therefore, not robust under...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011118290

From Bargaining Solutions to Claims Rules: A Proportional Approach

Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel; Osório, António; … - In: Games 6 (2015) 1, pp. 32-38

Agents involved in a conflicting claims problem may be concerned with the proportion of their claims that is satisfied, or with the total amount they get. In order to relate both perspectives, we associate to each conflicting claims problem a bargaining-in-proportions set. Then, we obtain a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011194439