We introduce learning in a dynamic game of international pollution, with ecological uncertainty. We characterize and compare the feedback non-cooperative emissions strategies of players when the players do not know the distribution of ecological uncertainty but they gain information (learn)...

We characterize the domestic production and imports of food by a country under two scenarios, namely: food security and welfare maximization, in a model with an exogenously given probability of occurrence of an embargo or other sources of supply disruption on the international grain market,...

We study the impact of collective effort in R&D in adaptation technologies, and also spillover effects on formation and size of stable international environmental agreements (IEAs). Our results suggest that it is possible to have more than one size of stable IEA. We can achieve a superior...

We introduce learning in a dynamic game of international pollution, with ecological uncertainty. We characterize and compare the feedback non-cooperative emissions strategies of players when the players do not know the distribution of ecological uncertainty but they gain information (learn)...

Purpose: While the commons problem and the issues related to the negative externalities of harvesting have been studied extensively, there remains a need to bridge these two streams of studies to comprehensively investigate the implications of the strategic interactions among resource...

We study the effect of heterogeneous growth in demand on resource extraction. Using the Great Fish War framework of Levhari and Mirman (1980), we show that heterogeneity in demand growth has a profound effect on both cooperative and non-cooperative solutions.