Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 50,764
Cover Image
Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
Holden, Richard J.; Kartik, Navin; Tercieux, Olivier - 2013
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010337877
Cover Image
Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
Holden, Richard J.; Kartik, Navin; Tercieux, Olivier - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752886
Cover Image
Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
Kartik, Navin; Tercieux, Olivier; Holden, Richard T. - In: Games and economic behavior 83 (2014), pp. 284-290
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010473506
Cover Image
Agendas in legislative decision-making
Horan, Sean - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 1, pp. 235-274
Despite the wide variety of agendas used in legislative settings, the literature on sophisticated voting has focused on two formats, the so-called Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas. In the current paper, I introduce a broad class of agendas whose defining structural features,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013188992
Cover Image
Agendas in legislative decision-making
Horan, Sean - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 1, pp. 235-274
Despite the wide variety of agendas used in legislative settings, the literature on sophisticated voting has focused on two formats, the so-called Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas. In the current paper, I introduce a broad class of agendas whose defining structural features,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415641
Cover Image
The not-so-secret-agent: Professional monitors, hierarchies and implementation
Baliga, Sandeep - In: Review of Economic Design 7 (2002) 1, pp. 17-26
implementation of the organization's objectives. We show that the introduction of a professional monitor (e.g. auditor, regulator …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370566
Cover Image
One-step-Ahead Implementation
Hayashi, Takashi; Lombardi, Michele - 2019
In many situations, agents are involved in an allocation problem that is followed by another allocation problem whose optimal solution depends on how the former problem has been solved. In this paper, we take this dynamic structure of allocation problems as an institutional constraint. By...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014034984
Cover Image
Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium
Haake, Claus-Jochen; Trockel, Walter - In: Review of Economic Design 26 (2021) 4, pp. 635-649
implementation via mechanisms with implementation via rights structures as introduced by Sertel (Designing rights: invisible hand … provide in a socio-legal system based on Nash’s demand game an implementation of the Nash bargaining solution in Debreu …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014497503
Cover Image
Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu-Hurwicz equilibrium
Haake, Claus-Jochen; Trockel, Walter - 2021
and Sonnenschein (1975) that also generalizes the dcmechanism of Koray and Yildiz (2018) which relates implementation via … mechanisms with implementation via rights structures as introduced by Sertel (2001). In the second part we apply and illustrate … provide in a socio-legal system based on Nash's demand game an implementation of the Nash bargaining solution in Debreu …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012606400
Cover Image
Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments
Healy, Paul J.; Mathevet, Laurent - In: Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) 3, pp. 609-661
We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in this mechanism design context, focusing instead on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599472