In this paper we introduce a model of cooperative game with externalities which generalizes games in partition function form by allowing players to take part in more than one coalition. We provide an extension of the Shapley value (1953) to these games, which is a generalization of the Myerson...

In this paper we give an axiomatic characterization of a family of measures of success defined by Laruelle and Valenciano (Soc Choice Welf 27:171–197, <CitationRef CitationID="CR10">2005</CitationRef>) for voting rules. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

In this study we define a cost-sharing rule for cost-sharing problems. This rule is related to the serial cost-sharing rule defined by Moulin and Shenker (Econometrica 60:1009–1037, <CitationRef CitationID="CR6">1992</CitationRef>). We give some formulas and axiomatic characterizations for the new rule. The axiomatic characterizations...</citationref>