Dans cet article, nous examinons les données de salaires annuels, de 1976 à 1998, d’une cohorte d’hommes, entrés sur le marché du travail en 1976. La richesse des données nous permet d’analyser la dynamique des salaires, au cours d’une partie du cycle de vie de cette cohorte, à la...

How a cost shock is passed through to final consumer prices may relate to nominal price stickiness and rigidities, the existence of nonadjustable cost components, strategic markup adjustments, or other contract terms along the supply distribution chain. This paper presents a simple framework to...

L'article analyse la régulation optimale d'un secteur industriel dont la production source de pollution est l'objet d'un contrat entre des parties indépendantes. L'apport des intrants nécessaires à l'activité est partagé entre le principal et l'agent, de sorte que l'externalité négative...

We develop and estimate a model of dynamic interactions in which commitment is limited and contracts are incomplete to explain the patterns of income and consumption growth in village economies of less developed countries. Households can insure each other through both formal contracts and...

We develop and estimate a model of dynamic interactions between households where commitment is limited and contracts are incomplete to explain the patterns of income and consumption growth in village economies of less developed countries. Households can insure through both formal contracts and...

We develop and estimate a model of dynamic interactions between households where commitment is limited and contracts are incomplete to explain the patterns of income and consumption growth in village economies of less developed countries. Households can insure through both formal contracts and...

We develop and estimate a model of dynamic interactions in which commitment is limited and contracts are incomplete to explain the patterns of income and consumption growth in village economies of less developed countries. Households can insure each other through both formal contracts and...

We develop and estimate a model of dynamic interactions where commitment is limited and contracts are incomplete to explain the patterns of income and consumption growth in village economies of less developed countries. Households can insure through both formal contracts and informal agreements,...

We develop and estimate a model of dynamic interactions in which commitment is limited and contracts are incomplete to explain the patterns of income and consumption growth in village economies of less developed countries. Households can insure each other through both formal contracts and...