This paper analyzes the implications of right-to-manage wage bargaining between a producers’ syndicate and a workers’ union representing finite numbers of identical members in a monetary macroeconomic model of the AS–AD type with government activity. At given prices and price expectations,...

This paper constitutes the third part in a series dealing with vNM-Stable Sets, see J. Rosenmüller, "Convex vNM-Stable Sets for a Semi Orthogonal Game. Part I" [IMW Working Paper no. 483 (2013)], "Convex vNM-Stable Sets for a Semi Orthogonal Game. Part II" [IMW Working Paper no. 498 (2014)]. We...

Motivated by trying to better understand the norms that govern pedestrian traffic, I study symmetric two-player coordination games with independent private values. The strategies of "always pass on the left" and "always pass on the right" are always equilibria of this game. Some such games,...

In this note I give a full characterization of all deterministic direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values that are dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced.

This paper constitutes the second part in a series dealing with vNM-Stable sets for (cooperative) linear production games with a continuum of players, see J. Rosenmüller, "Convex vNM-Stable Sets for a Semi Orthogonal Game. Part I" [IMW Working Paper no. 483 (2013)]. The coalitional function is...

This paper develops a search model with heterogeneous workers and social networks. High ability workers are more productive and have a larger number of professional contacts. Firms have a choice between a high cost vacancy in the regular labour market and a low cost job opening in the referral...

We develop a modification of the connections model by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) that takes into account negative externalities arising from the connectivity of direct and indirect neighbors, thus combining aspects of the connections model and the co-author model. We consider a general...

Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) prove the existence of influential cheap talk equilibria in one sender one receiver games when the state is multidimensional and the preferences of the sender are state-independent. We show that only the babbling equilibrium survives the introduction of any small...

The problem of how to rationally aggregate probability measures occurs in particular (i) when a group of agents, each holding probabilistic beliefs, needs to rationalise a collective decision on the basis of a single ‘aggregate belief system’ and (ii) when an individual whose belief system...