We consider (cooperative) linear production games with a continuum of players. The coalitional function is generated by r + 1 “production factors” that is, non atomic measures defined on an interval. r of these are orthogonal probabilities which, economically, can be considered as...

Firms often rely on external financing in order to conduct R&D. The question is to what extend discriminatory behaviour of the funds provider affects the industry evolution. The model is based on an evolutionary framework by Nelson and Winter. A firm chooses its R&D spending in an adaptive...

We establish a class of fully nonlinear conditional expectations. Similarly to the usage of linear expectations when a probabilistic description of uncertainty is present, we observe analogue quantitative and qualitative properties. The type of nonlinearity captures the agents sentiments of...

We present a model of opinion formation where individuals repeatedly engage in discussion and update their opinion in a social network similarly to the DeGroot model. Abstracting from the standard assumption that individuals always report their opinion truthfully, agents in our model interact...

The total output of an economy usually follows cyclical movements which are accompanied by similar movements in stock prices. The common explanation relies on the demand side. It points out that stock market wealth drives consumption which triggers production afterward. This paper focuses on...

We experimentally explore the effects of time pressure on decision making. Under different time allowance conditions, subjects are presented with a queueing situation and asked to join one of two queues that differ in length, server speed, and entry fee. The results can be grouped under two main...

We prove a lifting theorem, in the sense of Robinsonian nonstandard analysis, for the G-expectation. Herein, we use an existing discretization theorem for the G-expectation by T. Fadina and F. Herzberg (Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 503, (2014)).

Within this paper we establish the existence of a vNM-Stable Set for (cooperative) linear production games with a continuum of players. The coalitional function is generated by r+1 "production factors" (non atomic measures). r factors are given by orthogonal probabilities ("cornered" production...

In this paper we study a two-player investment game with a first mover advantage in continuous time with stochastic payoffs, driven by a geometric Brownian motion. One of the players is assumed to be ambiguous with maxmin preferences over a strongly rectangular set of priors. We develop a...

The question how to optimally design an infrastructure network that may be subject to intelligent threats is of highest interest. We address this problem by considering a Designer-Adversary game of optimal network design for the case of imperfect node defense. In this two-stage game, first the...