This paper derives in the context of the Arrow and Kurz model decision rules for public investment which apply whether or not the economy is on the optimal path and for a wide variety of institutional constraints. The method is comparative dynamics. The net benefits of a change in public...

This paper studies optimal linear income taxation and redistributive social insurance when the former has the traditional labor distortion and the latter generates both ex ante and ex post moral hazard. Private insurance is available and individuals differ in labor productivity and in loss...

This paper presents a selective and non-technical survey of the role of intergovernmental equalization transfers as a device for achieving efficiency in the allocation of labor across regions in a decentralized nation, and for achieving fiscal equity among residents of various regions. We...

This paper investigates the effect of asymmetric information on the annuities market when individuals differ in the probability of dying. Individual behaviour under live-insured and term-insured annuities is investigated. Unlike well-known results of Rothschild and Stiglitz, if an equilibrium...

This paper analyzes corporate and personal income taxes and inflation on the cost of investing in depreciable and inventory capital in Canada in 1963-78. Changes in rates of inflation and corporate tax rates theoretically have an ambiguous effect on the cost of capital. Tax depreciation and FIFO...

This paper reexamines Feldstein's (1974) results of the effect of social security on private capital accumulation in the context of a simultaneous-equation model. The model incorporates dynamic feedback effects and is estimated by FIML to incorporate theoretical restrictions that are tested...

We examine whether minimum wages can fulfill a useful role as part of an optimal nonlinear income tax scheme. In this setting, governments cannot observe household abilities, only their incomes. Redistributing according to income, the government is constrained by a set of incentive constraints....

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