, viewing identifiable information is costly, which may discourage people from accessing such information. To address this … question, we design a public goods experiment in which participants can pay a fee to view information about identities and … information, and a treatment in which all contributors are freely identified. Our main findings are that: (1) contributions in the …

We experimentally investigate the impact of visibility of contributors and cost of information on public good …, even when viewing contributors’ information is costly. This effect holds even though the identities of contributors are …

information is costly, which may discourage people from accessing it. We design a public goods experiment in which participants … can pay to view information about identities and contributions of group members. We compare this to a treatment in which … there is no identifiable information, and a treatment in which all contributors are identified. Our main findings are that …

We experimentally investigate how different information about others' individual contributions affects conditional … cooperators' willingness to cooperate in a one-shot linear public goods game. We find that when information about individual … contributions is provided, contributions are generally higher than when only average information is available. This effect is …

We experimentally investigate how different information about others’ individual contributions affects conditional … cooperators’ willingness to cooperate in a one-shot linear public goods game. We find that when information about individual … contributions is provided, contributions are generally higher than when only average information is available. This effect is …

We experimentally investigate how different information about others' individual contributions affects conditional … cooperators' willingness to cooperate in a one-shot linear public goods game. We find that when information about individual … contributions is provided, contributions are generally higher than when only average information is available. This effect is …

We experimentally investigate the impact of visibility of information about contributors on contributions in the public …, we vary the cost of viewing identifiable information about contributors. Second, we vary recognizing all, top or bottom … contributors is as effective as recognizing all contributors. When viewing information about contributors is costly, there is no …