We show that open ascending auctions are prone to inecient rushes, i.e. all bidders quitting at the same price, in market environments such as privatizations, takeover contests, and procurement auctions. Rushes arise when an incumbent with better information about a common value component of the...

This paper sets the groundwork for analysis of the effect of selection into labor force on gender unemployment gaps. We derive the Manski bounds for gender unemployment gaps in 21 EU countries and show that in addition to the positive selection documented in the gender wage gap research, there...

This paper describes a classroom experiment demnstrating the price mechanism and the clearing of the markets in an endowment economy. Participants receive random endowments of two goods they may trade in order to maximize a given utility function. A market-clearing price is reached when no...

In this paper we empirically show that a more intensive use and wider adoption of telecommunication technologies significantly increases the level of product market competition in services and goods markets. Our result is consistent with the view that the use of telecommunication technologies...

We analyze the rationale for hiding information in open auction formats. In particular, we focus on the incentives for a bidder to call a price higher than the highest standing one in order to prevent the remaining active bidders from aggregating more accurate information that could be gathered...

This paper examines the choice of tools for managing a firm’s operational risks: cash reserves, insurance contracts, and financial assets under an optimal financing contract that solves moral hazard between insiders and outside investors. Risk management is valuable as it reduces the costs of...

In this paper we investigate the effects of introduction of lump sum copayments on the utilization of prescription drugs by elderly patients. We make use of an unique dataset and analyze the policy change that implemented patient cost-sharing in the Czech Republic starting in 2008. After the...

Does the type of post-auction feedback affect bidding behavior in first price auctions? Filiz- Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) find that such manipulation can increase bids in a one-shot auction. They explain this as an effect of anticipated regret combined with the assumption that feedback directly...

We present a two-stage coordination game in which early choices of experts with special interests are observed by followers who move in the second stage. We show that the equilibrium outcome is biased toward the experts' interests even though followers know the distribution of expert interests...

This article uses data on Czech public procurement contracts from 2005 - 2010 in order to uncover patterns suggestive of corrupt behavior of procuring officials. Using polynomial regressions and local linear density estimators, the article provides evidence that procurement officials manipulate...