. Our model implies that (i) the probability of detection and the fine might be complements; (ii) the optimal monitoring … its findings. If the firm holds back information, it might be detected and fined. We show that optimal monitoring is … equilibrium and more stringent monitoring is costless, increasing the probability of detection might not be beneficial; and (iv …

. Our model implies that (i) the probability of detection and the fine might be complements; (ii) the optimal monitoring … its findings. If the firm holds back information, it might be detected and fined. We show that optimal monitoring is … equilibrium and more stringent monitoring is costless, increasing the probability of detection might not be beneficial; and (iv …

. Our model implies that (i) the probability of detection and the fine might be complements; (ii) the optimal monitoring … its findings. If the firm holds back information, it might be detected and fined. We show that optimal monitoring is … equilibrium and more stringent monitoring is costless, increasing the probability of detection might not be beneficial; and (iv …

. Our model implies that (i) the probability of detection and the fine might be complements; (ii) the optimal monitoring … its findings. If the firm holds back information, it might be detected and fined. We show that optimal monitoring is … equilibrium and more stringent monitoring is costless, increasing the probability of detection might not be beneficial; and (iv …

This paper evaluates the effects of the lack of regulatory commitment on emission tax applied by the regulator … find that the lack of commitment leads to lower taxation and abatement that yield larger emissions and, consequently, a … social welfare. Thus, our analysis indicates that the lack of commitment has a negative impact of welfare although this …

This paper evaluates the effects of the lack of regulatory commitment on emission tax applied by the regulator … find that the lack of commitment leads to lower taxation and abatement that yield larger emissions and, consequently, a … social welfare. Thus, our analysis indicates that the lack of commitment has a negative impact of welfare although this …

This paper studies the effect of timing and commitment of verification in a principal-agent relationship with moral …'s verification effort. Two verification procedures are discussed: monitoring where the principal verifies the agent's behavior … the time of contracting. The main contribution of this paper is to highlight the importance of commitment by the principal …