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In this paper we consider a cost allocation problem arising in a consortium for urban solid wastes collection and disposal. A classical allocation rule is the proportional division according to the volume of wastes collected; here we propose a different allocation method, rooted in game theory,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950125
In the paper we consider a problem of bank cost reduction by joint usage of ATMs. In coalition case, we assume that cooperation may be naturally restricted by a coalition structure. A question of stability of a coalition structure with respect to the Shapley value is investigated. Statements...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010894096
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We provide an axiomatization-based justification for applying the Owen value to decompose R2 in OLS models if prior knowledge can be used to form groups of regressor variables. The assumptions made by the axioms are not only plausible with respect to the variables but also clarify the meaning of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307410
We introduce an Owen-type value for games with two-level communication structures, being structures where the players are partitioned into a coalition structure such that there exists restricted communication between as well as within the a priori unions of the coalition structure. Both types of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326497
A well known and simple game to model markets is the glove game where worth is produced by building matching pairs. For glove games, different concepts, like the Shapley value, the restricted Shapley value or the Owen value, yield diff erent distributions of worth. Moreover, computational effort...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010327837
We study the efficient computation of power indices for weighted voting games with precoalitions amongst subsets of players (reflecting, e.g., ideological proximity) using the paradigm of dynamic programming. Starting from the state-of-the-art algorithms for computing the Banzhaf and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200163
The mechanism by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) for non-transferable utility (NTU) games is generalized so that a coalition structure among players is taken into account. The new mechanism yields the Owen value for transferable utility (TU) games with coalition structure as well as the consistent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370769
This paper presents two new axiomatizations of the Owen value for games with coalition structures. Two associated games are defined and a consistency axiom is required. The construction of the associated games presupposes that coalitions behave in an aggressive manner towards players who are not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375631