We test the effect of advice on the well known top trading cycles (TTC) matching algorithm in a school choice frame work. We compare three treatments involving third party advice [right advice (R), wrong advice (W), and both right and wrong advice (RW)] to a no-advice baseline (B). In line with...

We study individual decision making in a lottery-choice task performed by three different populations: gamblers under psychological treatment ("addicts"), gamblers' spouses ("victims"), and people who are neither gamblers or gamblers' spouses ("normals"). We find that addicts are willing to take...

In this paper we consider data from a large number of economic experiments, and look for demographic effects that may be a source of subject pool bias if not carefully accounted for in the subsequent statistical analysis. Our dataset contains information on 2,408 subjects and 597 experimental...

We study individual decision making in a lottery-choice task performed by three subject populations: gamblers under psychological treatment (“addicts”), gamblers’ relatives (“victims”), and normal (as far as gambling is considered) individuals. We find that addicts are willing to take...

This is a study about the possibility of self-governance. We designed two versions of a step-level public good game, with or without a centralized sanctioning mechanism (CSM). In a baseline treatment participants play 14 rounds of the non-CSM game. In an automatic removal (AR) treatment...

Multi-unit auctions are sometimes plagued by the so-called exposure problem. In this paper, we analyze a simple game called the 'chopstick auction' in which bidders are confronted with the exposure problem. We analyze the chopstick auction with incomplete information both in theory and in a...

We test the effect of the amount of information on the strategies played by others in the theoretically strategy-proof Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism. We find that providing limited information on the strategies played by others has a negative and significant effect in truth-telling rates...

We present results from 50-round duopoly and triopoly experiments. Firms decide repeatedly both on price and quantity of a perishable good. Each firm has capacity to serve the whole market. The stage game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. Most markets evolve either to monopolies...

This paper compares individual with collective contracts using modified repeated gift exchange games. The game had two variations, both following a partner design. In the individual variation different workers in the same firm can receive separate wages, and in the collective variation all...