We present a multi-unit common value auction model with capacity constraints which ensure the participants face a residual market. We show that a discriminatory auction performs better than a uniform one when such constraints are present. We then look at a more explicit model of electricity...

We construct a regulation model in which renegotiation occurs due to the imperfect enforcement of concession contracts. This enables us to provide theoretical predictions for the impact, on the probability of renegotiation of a concession, of regulatory institutions, institutional features,...

In this paper we extend the standard matching analysis of decentralized markets allowing for the possibility that some traders are matched to more than one trader on the opposite side of the market. In contrast to the literature, we are able to reconcile the Walrasian equilibrium with the...

This paper studies the enforcement abilities of authorities with a limited commitment to punishing violators. Commitment of resources su±cient to punish only one agent is needed to enforce high compliance of an arbitrary number of agents. Though existence of other, non-compliance equilibria is...

This paper presents a survey of recent research on the economics of infrastructure in developing countries. Energy, transport, telecommunications, water and sanitation are considered. The survey covers two main set of issues: the linkages between infrastructure and economic growth (at the...

In sharp contrast with the economic literature on conflict, this paper shows that confrontation may be efficiency enhancing. Conditions are derived under which a contest over the exclusive control of a resource Pareto dominates open access. When the population size is big enough or production...

This paper briefly and informally surveys different theoretical models of relative concerns and their relation to inequality. Models of inequity aversion in common use in experimental economics imply a negative relation between inequality and happiness. In contrast, empirical studies on...

We examine the possibilities for communication between agents with divergent preferences in a noisy environment. Taking Crawford and Sobel’s [4] (noiseless) communication game as a reference point, we study a model in which there is a probability e ? (0, 1) that the received message is a...

This paper analyzes how institutions aimed at coordinating economic interactions may appear. We build a model in which agents play a prisoners’ dilemma game in a hypothetical state of nature. Agents can delegate the task of enforcing cooperation in interactions to one of them in exchange for a...

This paper generalizes the existing cointegration analysis literature in two respects. Firstly, the problem of efficient estimation of vector error correction models containing exogenous (1) variables is examined. The asymptotic distributions of the (log- )likelihood ratio statistics for testing...