Focusing on the Colombian armed conflict, this paper develops for the first time a within-country analysis of violence duration. It examines a wide range of factors potentially associated with violence duration at the municipal level for the period 1988--2004, including geographic factors,...

I develop a dynamic model of social conflict whereby manifest grievances of the poor generate the incentive of taking over political power violently. Rebellion can be an equilibrium outcome depending on the level of preexisting inequality between the poor and the ruling elite, the relative...

What is the relationship between the type of training combatants receive upon recruitmentinto an armed group and their propensity to abuse civilians in civil war? Does military training or political training prevent or exacerbate the victimization of civilians by armed non-state actors? While...

What is the relationship between the type of training combatants receive upon recruitment into an armed group and their propensity to abuse civilians in civil war? Does military training or political training prevent or exacerbate the victimization of civilians by armed non-state actors? While...

We study the relationship between some of the most important recent events of the Colombian armed conflict and the foreign perception of sovereign risk, as measured by the Credit Default Swap (CDS) of the Colombian bonds. Using a recent methodology we estimate the causal effect of conflict...

The growing empirical literature on the analysis of civil war has recently included the study of conflict duration at the cross-country level. This paper presents, for the first time, a within-country analysis of the determinants of violence duration. I focus on the experience of the Colombian...

How do income shocks affect armed conflict? Theory suggests two opposite effects. If labour is used to appropriate resources violently, higher wages may lower conflict by reducing labour supplied to appropriation. This is the opportunity cost effect. Alternatively, a rise in contestable income...

I develop a dynamic model of social conflict whereby manifest grievances of the poor generate the incentive of taking over political power violently. Rebellion can be an equilibrium outcome depending on the level of preexisting inequality between the poor and the ruling elite, the relative...