The goal of this paper is provide a theory of K-person non-stationary Markov games with unbounded rewards, for a countable state space and action spaces. We investigate both the finite and infinite horizon problems. We define the concept of strong Nash equilibrium and present conditions for both...

A dynamic normal formulation for differential games is introduced and the "pedestrian principle" is discussed as a means of dynamically implementing the equilibrium strategy in a single game. Our formulation emphasizes the distinction between a player's rational prediction and the actual...

We introduce the dual of a stochastic game with incomplete information on one side, and we deduce some properties of optimal strategies of the uninformed player.

The paper analyzes a negotiation between two players (e.g. finns in duopoly wishing to fonn a cartel or countries involved in a trade dispute) about levels of their activities that may be hannful to the other player. Negotiation takes place in discrete time, with alternating offers of the two...

The paper analyzes negotiation about contracts between the buyer and the seller. A contract specifies the quantity delivered by the seller and the buyer's payment for each period within its time horizon. In each period without a valid contract any party can withdraw from negotiation forever. Any...

When voting takes place in democratic institutions, we find (either explicitly or implicitly) that there is an agenda setter or a formateur. Such players are uniquely able to make substantive proposals for given topics. Their statuses remain intact even after rejection of proposals, but they...