Based on the acquiring-a-company game of Samuelson and Bazerman (1985), we theoretically and experimentally analyze the acquisition of a firm. Thereby we compare cases of symmetrically and asymmetrically informed buyers and sellers. This setting allows us to predict and test the effects of...

We present a model of price leadership on homogeneous product markets where the price leader is selected endogenously. The price leader sets and guarantees a sales price to which followers adjust according to their individual supply functions. The price leader clears the market by serving the...

In three-person envy games, an allocator, a responder, and a dummy player interact. Since agreement payoffs of responder and dummy are exogenously given, there is no tradeoff between allocator payoff and the payoffs of responder and dummy. Rather, the allocator chooses the size of the pie and...

"It has often been discussed whether institutional regulations aimed at protecting specific groups of the labour market have indeed succeeded in achieving the intended goal or whether they have actually aggravated the labour market position of these groups. In our paper we analyse German...

"In times of massive employment reduction, outplacement services are increasingly popular. However, the empirical knowledge of the provision of outplacement services is limited. In our paper we present the results of an original survey of more than 1,000 German firms that systematically renders...

"The failure of the more recent attempts to discriminate between alternative explanation approaches of wages above the collectively agreed level (market, negotiation, and efficiency wage approach) (cf. last Bellman/Kohaut 1995 in this journal) is probably not the result of a data deficit, but of...

Based on the "acquiring-a-company" game of Samuelson and Bazerman (1985), we theoretically and experimentally analyze the acquisition of a firm. Thereby we compare cases of symmetrically and asymmetrically informed buyers and sell- ers. This setting allows us to predict and test the effects of...

We study price competition in heterogeneous markets where price decisions are delegated to agents. Principals implement a revenue sharing scheme to which agents react by commonly charging a sales price. The results of our model exemplify the importance of both intrafirm- and interfirm...

We present a model of price leadership on homogeneous product markets where the price leader is selected endogenously. The price leader sets and guarantees a sales price to which followers adjust according to their individual supply functions. The price leader clears the market by serving the...