We analyze the effects of asymmetric information concerning thesize of a pie on proposer behavior in three different bargaining situations:the ultimatum game, the Yes-No-game and the dictator game.Our data show that (a) irrespective of the information condition, proposergenerosity increases with...

We study interaction effects between intra-firm conflicts and interfirm competitionon a duopolistic market with seller firms employing one or more agents and imple-menting tournament incentives. We show that inter-firm competition leads to higherincentive intensity, higher efforts and output...

To commit credibly in bargaining is crucial: In the ultimatum game with its one–sided early commitment power the “proposer” gets (nearly) the whole pie while the“responder” is left with (almost) nothing. When both parties commit simultaneouslythe (a)symmetric Nash(1950)–bargaining...

It has been claimed that people often prefer equity-like considerations and tend to ignore strategic aspects in fair division problems. Here, this is explored by analyzing whether or not such behavioral disposition is evolutionary stable. The answer however is ambiguous: Both, reacting to and...

Provisions for maternity leave are common among industrialized countries, but their institutional design varies distinctly from country to country. Developing our theory on the impact on maternity leave regulations on women's labor market situation, we argue that a woman on leave creates a...

Die vorliegende Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, wie Unternehmen mit gut ausgebildeten Arbeitnehmern die Beschäftigung und das Lohnniveau im Konjunkturverlauf anpassen.

We argue that the link between women directors in co‐determined supervisory boards and firm innovation depends on two contextual factors: (1) Women directors' power, as measured by their share among shareholder representatives, and (2) on whether women are represented in both representative...

In two-person generosity games the proposer's agreement payoffis exogenously given whereas that of the responder is endogenouslydetermined by the proposer's choice of the pie size. Earlier resultsfor two-person generosity games show that participants seem to caremore for eciency than for equity....