In a Bayesian model of group decision-making, dependence among the agents' types has been shown to have a beneficial effect on the design of incentive compatible mechanisms that achieve the efficient choice associated with complete information. This effect is shown here to depend as much upon...

Shill bidding has increased substantially in recent years since the technology employed to conduct on-line auctions enables many sellers to disguise their identities and bid. Although their intent is to gain by misleading the bidders on the value of the object, we show that in a common value...

An efficient, interim individually rational, ex post budget balanced Bayesian mechanism is shown to be payoff equivalent to an ex post individually rational and ex ante budget balanced dominant strategy mechanism. This result simplifies the search for mechanisms that implement efficient...

This classroom experiment illustrates the efficiency-enhancing property of a Tiebout system in which local public goods decisions are determined by a political process. Students are given playing cards that induce diverse preferences for expenditures on alternative public goods and are initially...

In government procurement auctions of construction contracts, entrants are typically less informed and bid more aggressively than incumbent firms. This bidding behavior makes them more susceptible to losses a¤ecting their prospect of survival. In April of 2000, the Oklahoma Department of...

This paper considers efficient Bayesian mechanisms for the provision of collective goods. We study the impact of excludability and the nature of externalities exhibited by collective goods upon incentives. We demonstrate that if a good is rivalrous only excludability of benefits allows a...

We investigate differences in bidding behavior and participation patterns between simultaneous and multi-round auction formats held in the state of Oklahoma. Theory suggests there could be differential bidding effects arising from synergies and the release of relevant information across the two...