We explain why a durable-goods monopolist would like to create a shortage in the marketplace.We argue that this incentive arises from the presence of a second-hand market and uncertainty about consumers' willingness to pay for the good. Consumers are heterogeneous in their valuations. Moreover,...

This paper studies the impact of liability on a credence-good seller's incentives to maintain a good reputation. Credence goods markets are characterized with information asymmetry about the value of sellers' services to consumers who must rely on sellers for diagnosis and treatment provision....

A decision maker offers a new product to a fixed number of adopters. The decision maker does not know the value of the product while adopters receive some private information about the value. We study how the decision maker may influence learning among adopters by manipulating the launch...

I study credence goods markets when there are both selfish and conscientious experts. The selfish expert is a profit maximizer. The conscientious expert wants to maximize profit and repair the consumer's problem. There are two classes of equilibria: uniform-price equilibria and nonuniform-price...