A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's payoffs. It is radically …, radically uncoupled learning rules whose period-by-period behavior comes arbitrarily close to Nash equilibrium behavior in any …

A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's payoffs. It is radically …, radically uncoupled learning rules whose period-by-period behavior comes arbitrarily close to Nash equilibrium behavior in any …

A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's payoffs. It is radically …, radically uncoupled learning rules whose period-by-period behavior comes arbitrarily close to Nash equilibrium behavior in any …

The paper investigates social-learning when the information structure is not commonly known. Individuals repeatedly … interact in social-learning settings with distinct information structures. In each round of interaction, they use their … behavior in the long-run if and only if individuals distinguish social-learning settings and receive rich feedback after each …

a player's beliefs. By imposing a consistency requirement we obtain an equilibrium notion which we call regret …-best responses. Additional properties are studied and the regret equilibrium concept is compared with other game theoretic solution … concepts. The regret equilibrium concept is illustrated by means of interesting examples. It is shown that in the centipede …