This paper deals with bankruptcy problems in which the players have different utility functions defined in terms of the quantity of allocated resources. We tackle this kind of situation by means of a game without transferable utility and provide two characterizations of the CEA-rule in this...

This paper deals with the concepts of core and Weber set with a priori unions à la Owen. As far as we know, the Owen approach to games with a priori unions has never been studied from the coalitional stability point of view. Thus we introduce the coalitional core and coalitional Weber set and...

This paper deals with bankruptcy problems in which the players have different utility functions defined in terms of the quantity of allocated resources. We tackle this kind of situation by means of a game without transferable utility and provide two characterizations of the CEA-rule in this...

The aim of this note is to provide a unified theory of all compromise values defined as the τ-value in cooperative game theory. The so-called covariance property plays a crucial role in our approach and, related to this property, a family of covariant compromise values is introduced. The...