We study impersonal exchange, and ask how agents can behave honestly in anonymous transactions without contracts. We analyze repeated anonymous random matching games, where agents observe only their own transactions. Little is known about cooperation in this setting beyond the prisoner's...

In this paper we bring a novel approach to the theory of tournament rankings. We combine two different theories that are widely used to establish rankings of populations after a given tournament. First, we use the statistical approach of paired comparison analysis to define the performance of a...

In this paper, we study the potential implications of a novel yet natural voting system: strategic sequential voting. Each voter has one vote and can choose when to cast his vote. After each voting period, the current count of votes is publicized enabling subsequent voters to use this...

Often, perfect bayesian equilibrium is loosely defined by stating that players should be sequentially rational given some beliefs in which Bayes rule is applied whenever possible". We show that there are games in which it is not clear what whenever possible" means. Then, we provide a simple...

In this paper we present an axiomatic analysis of several ranking methods for general tournaments. We find that the ranking method obtained by applying maximum likelihood to the (Zermelo-)Bradley-Terry model, the most common method in statistics and psychology, is one of the ranking methods that...

repeated anonymous random matching setting. It is well known that, if the stage-game is the prisoner's dilemma, cooperation can be supported in equilibrium through grim trigger, also called 'community enforcement' or contagion in this setting. But, little is known about sustaining cooperation in...