We study the consequences of a solidarity property that specifies how a value for cooperative games should respond if some player forfeits his productivity, i.e., becomes a null player. Nullified solidarity states that in this case either all players weakly gain together or all players weakly...

We study values for transferable utility games enriched by a communication graph (CO-games) where the graph does not necessarily a¤ect the productivity but can in?uence the way the players distribute the worth generated by the grand coalition. Thus, we can envisage values that are efficient...

We study values for transferable utility games enriched by a communication graph. The most well-known such values are component-efficient and characterized by some link-deletion property. We study efficient extensions of such values: for a given component-efficient value, we look for a value...

The principle of weak monotonicity for cooperative games states that if a game changes so that the worth of the grand coalition and some player's marginal contribution to all coalitions increase or stay the same, then this player's payoff should not decrease. We investigate the class of values...

We provide new characterisations of the equal surplus division value. This way, the difference between the Shapley value, the equal surplus division value, and the equal division value is pinpointed to one axiom.

We suggest a new one-parameter family of solidarity values for TU-games. The members of this class are distinguished by the type of player whose removal from a game does not affect the remaining players’ payoffs. While the Shapley value and the equal division value are the boundary members of...

The Coleman Power of the Collectivity to Act (CPCA) is a popular statistic that reflects the ability of a committee to pass a proposal. Applying the Shapley value to this measure, we derive a new power index that indicates each voter's contribution to the CPCA. This index is characterized by...

The principle of weak monotonicity for cooperative games states that if a game changes so that the worth of the grand coalition and some player's marginal contribution to all coalitions increase or stay the same, then this player's payoff should not decrease. We investigate the class of values...