estimate the sharing rule using 2000 Census data and implement a semi-parametric test of the over-identifying restrictions.

This paper develops the collective marriage matching model, a behavioral and empirically flexible framework that incorporates both marriage matching and intrahousehold allocations. The model shows how marriage market equilibrium and bargaining power within the family are simultaneously...

estimated model shows that a concern for accumulating marriage specific capital is quantitatively significant in generating positive assortative matching in spousal ages at marriage, gender differences in spousal ages at marriage, and a preference for early marriage. Gender variations in...

The objective of the paper is to develop and estimate a non-parametric dynamic model of the marriage market. Individuals are differentiated by their age and current marital status. In each period, unmarried men and women choose whether they want to marry and who to marry. Equilibrium transfers...

This paper develops the collective marriage matching model, a behavioral and empirically flexible framework that incorporates both marriage matching and intrahousehold allocations. The model shows how marriage market equilibrium and bargaining power within the family are simultaneously...

We develop and estimate an empirical collective model with endogenous marriage formation, participation, and family labor supply. Intra-household transfers arise endogenously as the transfers that clear the marriage market. The intra-household allocation can be recovered from observations on...

We develop and estimate an empirical collective model with endogenous marriage formation, participation, and family labor supply. Intra-household transfers arise endogenously as the transfers that clear the marriage market. The intra-household allocation can be recovered from observations on...

We develop and estimate an empirical collective model with endogenous marriage formation, participation, and family labor supply. Intra-household transfers arise endogenously as the transfers that clear the marriage market. The intra-household allocation can be recovered from observations on...