We experimentally investigate a bargaining environment in which players negotiate over a fixed payment to one player …. Moreover, bargaining frictions increase as risk increases, and we document more frequent disagreements as risk increases. When … bargaining models require some separation between the determinants of bargaining power and fair compensation for risk exposure. …

We experimentally investigate a bargaining environment in which players negotiate over a fixed payment to one player …. Moreover, bargaining frictions increase as risk increases, and we document more frequent disagreements as risk increases. When … bargaining models require some separation between the determinants of bargaining power and fair compensation for risk exposure. …

We study dynamic notions of fairness via an experiment of a two-round bilateral bargaining environment, where the … player exposed to risk a residual claimant. The ex-post risk not only provides substantive issues for bargaining parties to …

We experimentally investigate the effect of time pressure in a rich-context, unstructured bargaining game with earned … explained by a stronger connection between the tension in first proposals and the final bargaining outcome under time pressure …

We experimentally investigate the effect of time pressure in a rich-context, unstructured bargaining game with earned … explained by a stronger connection between the tension in first proposals and the final bargaining outcome under time pressure …

We experimentally investigate the effect of time pressure in a rich-context, unstructured bargaining game with earned … explained by a stronger connection between the tension in first proposals and the final bargaining outcome under time pressure …

We experimentally investigate the effect of time pressure in a rich-context, unstructured bargaining game with earned … explained by a stronger connection between the tension in first proposals and the final bargaining outcome under time pressure …

The power to influence the allocation of resources in coalitional bargaining stems from an agent's ability to form …). We distinguish between coalitional commitment, where parties defer distributive bargaining when forming a coalition, and … affects the source bargaining power: proportionality is key when coalitional commitment is available prior to allocative …

outcome with the results of corresponding "semi-structured" (cooperative) bargaining procedures. A significantly higher … frequency of the grand coalition formation, the higher efficiency, and the allocation belonging to the bargaining set is …