Showing 101 - 110 of 2,771
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090323
Abstract: We study the relation between liquidity in financial markets and post-trading fees (i.e. clearing and settlement fees). The clearing and settlement agent (CSD) faces different marginal costs for different types of transactions. Costs are lower for an internalized transaction, i.e. when...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090324
This paper considers two-stage solutions for multi-issue allocation situations.Characterisations are provided for the two-stage constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules, based on the properties of composition and path independence.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090325
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090326
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090327
Abstract: Little is known about how different bonus schemes affect traders’ propensity to trade and which bonus schemes improve traders’ performance. We study the effects of linear versus threshold (convex) bonus schemes on traders’ behavior. Traders purchase and sell shares in an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090328
AMS classifications: 60C05; 60K25; 90B06; 90B22
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090329
It is well known that an upper semi-continuous compact- and convex-valued mapping ö from a nonempty compact and convex set X to the Euclidean space of which X is a subset has at least one stationary point, being a point in X at which the image ö (x)has a nonempty intersection with the normal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090330
This paper presents some two-step estimators for a wide range of parametric panel data models with censored endogenous variables and sample selection bias. Our approach is to derive estimates of the unobserved heterogeneity responsible for the endogeneity/selection bias to include as additional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090331
This paper describes a principal-agent relationship with a supervisor who has information about the agent. The agent and the supervisor have the possibility to collude and misinform the principal. From the literature we know that there exists an optimal contract which excludes collusion in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090332