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Strategic market interaction is modelled as a two-stage game where potential entrants choose capacities and active firms compete in prices or quantities. Due to capital indivisibility, the capacity choice is made from a finite grid. In either strategic setting, the equilibrium of the game...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766521
precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes not only in the case of private firms but also when a public firm is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011113442
precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes not only in the case of private firms but also when a public firm is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019315
With few exceptions, the literature on the role of capacity as a strategic entry deterrent has assumed Cournot …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005597843
This paper examines the feasibility of collusion in capacity constrained duopoly supergames. In each period firms simultaneously set a price-quantity pair specifying the price for the period and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell as this price. Under price-quantity competition...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005786790
This study is the first to investigate the effect of demand rationing in experimental Bertrand-Edgeworth markets with fixed exogenous capacities. It is found that prices and profits are significantly higher under proportional than under efficient demand rationing. Moreover, the amount of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011412814
Price competition with increasing marginal costs, though relevant for many markets, appears as an under-researched field in the experimental oligopoly literature. We provide results from an experiment that varies the number of firms as well as the demand rationing and matching schemes in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011412816
Strategic market interaction is here modelled as a two-stage game in which potential entrants choose capacities and active firms compete in prices. Due to capital indivisibility, the capacity choice is made from a finite grid and there are substantial economies of scale. In the simplest version...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008555369
The paper extends the analysis of price competition among capacity-constrained sellers beyond the cases of duopoly and symmetric oligopoly.We first provide some general results for the oligopoly and then focus on the triopoly, providing a complete characterization of the mixed strategy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005836834
The paper extends the analysis of price competition among capacity-constrained sellers beyond the cases of duopoly and symmetric oligopoly. We first provide some general results for the oligopoly and then focus on the triopoly, providing a complete characterization of the mixed strategy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005837398