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We examine the portfolio choice of banks in a micro-funded model of runs. To insure riskaverse investors against liquidity risk, competitive banks offer demand deposits. We use global games to link the probability of a bank run to the portfolio choice. Based upon interim information about risky...
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We examine the portfolio choice of banks in a micro-funded model of runs. To insure riskaverse investors against liquidity risk, competitive banks offer demand deposits. We use global games to link the probability of a bank run to the portfolio choice. Based upon interim information about risky...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012101651
Risk-averse investors induce competitive intermediaries to hold safe assets, thereby lowering the probability of a run and reducing financial fragility. We revisit Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), who obtain a unique equilibrium in the banking model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) by introducing risky...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013031411
This paper identifies rating verifiability as a key difference that explains why credit rating agencies (CRAs) failed to mitigate information asymmetries in the structured finance market but succeeded in the bond market. Two infinitely repeated models are analyzed. In the first, the rating is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010592567
This paper identifies rating verifiability as a key difference that explains why credit rating agencies (CRAs) failed to mitigate information asymmetries in the structured finance market but succeeded in the bond market. Two infinitely repeated models are analyzed. In the first, the rating is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011133753
In Elamin (2013), the credit rating agency (CRA) cannot credibly fully reveal its information about the quality of a rated structured finance project, when ratings are unverifiable. Can the fear of losing its reputation discipline the CRA? In this paper, there is incomplete information about the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011114910
I show, under intuitive conditions on the risk-averse utility function, the nonoptimality of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) contract in the Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) environment. If marginal utility at zero is low enough, then Goldstein and Pauzner (2005)’s claim about the optimality of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011115681
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