Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 53,544
Cover Image
Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered
Schmitz, Patrick W. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
The government wants two tasks to be performed. In each task, unobservable effort can be exerted by a wealth-constrained private contractor. If the government faces no binding budget constraints, it is optimal to bundle the tasks. The contractor in charge of both tasks then gets a bonus payment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107973
Cover Image
Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered
Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
The government wants two tasks to be performed. In each task, unobservable effort can be exerted by a wealth-constrained private contractor. If the government faces no binding budget constraints, it is optimal to bundle the tasks. The contractor in charge of both tasks then gets a bonus payment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084088
Cover Image
Public procurement in times of crisis: The bundling decision reconsidered
Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Economics Letters 121 (2013) 3, pp. 533-536
The government wants two tasks to be performed. In each task, unobservable effort can be exerted by a wealth-constrained private contractor. If the government faces no binding budget constraints, it is optimal to bundle the tasks. The contractor in charge of both tasks then gets a bonus payment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010729453
Cover Image
Public Procurement in Times of Crisis : The Bundling Decision Reconsidered
Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2019
The government wants two tasks to be performed. In each task, unobservable effort can be exerted by a wealth-constrained private contractor. If the government faces no binding budget constraints, it is optimal to bundle the tasks. The contractor in charge of both tasks then gets a bonus payment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012891764
Cover Image
Public Contracting for Private Innovation : Government Expertise, Decision Rights, and Performance Outcomes
Bruce, Joshua R. - 2018
We examine how the U.S. Federal Government governs R&D contracts with private-sector firms. The government chooses between two contractual forms: grants and cooperative agreements. The latter provides the government substantially greater discretion over, and monitoring of, project progress....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012917011
Cover Image
Public-Private Partnerships Versus Traditional Procurement : Innovation Incentives and Information Gathering
Hoppe, Eva I. - 2012
A government agency wants a facility to be built and managed to provide a public service. Two different modes of provision are considered. In a public-private partnership, the tasks of building and managing are bundled, whereas under traditional procurement, these tasks are delegated to separate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013116354
Cover Image
The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered : Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts
Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2023
We revisit the contract-theoretic literature on privatization initiated by Hart et al. (1997). This literature has two major shortcomings. First, it is focused on ex-ante investment incentives, whereas ex-post inefficiencies which are ubiquitous in the real world cannot be explained. Second,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014348766
Cover Image
How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects
Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2019
investments to come up with innovations. It turns out that depending on the nature of the innovations, bundling may either …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015264929
Cover Image
Imperfect Bundling In Public-Private Partnerships
Greco, Luciano - Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno", … - 2012
Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to carry out a contract with the government. Because of incomplete contracts, the bundling of tasks is …-improving PPPs reduces with respect to the case of perfect bundling, and the private negotiation always awards a suboptimal SPV …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010702034
Cover Image
Sequential Procurement Auctions with Risk-Averse Suppliers
Nishimura, Takeshi - 2012
We compare two procurement mechanisms, bundling and unbundling, in a two-stage auction model with risk-averse suppliers … that an increase in the aggregate risk renders bundling less preferable to unbundling, from the viewpoint of both the buyer … and the society. The result still holds even if subcontracting is possible under bundling. On the other hand, an increase …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013099394