To what extent does a more competent public bureaucracy contribute to better economic outcomes? We address this question in the context of the US federal procurement of services and works, by combining contract-level data on procurement performance and bureau-level data on competence and...

Centralization of public procurement can lower prices for the government's direct purchase of goods and services. This paper focuses on indirect savings. Public administrations that do not procure directly through a central procurement agency might benefit from the availability of...

I find that current US's and EU's Antitrust laws -- in particular their "moderate" leniency programmes that only reduce or at best cancel sanctions for price-fixing firms that self-report -- may make collusion enforceable even in one-shot competitive interactions, like Bertrand oligopolies and...

Leniency programs reduce sanctions for law violators that self-report. I focus on their ability to deter price-fixing cartels - and organized crime in general - by increasing incentives to "cheat" on partners. Moderate leniency programs that reduce/cancel sanctions for a spontaneously reporting...