It is well known that height is positively associated with earnings. Based on individual level data, this paper investigates the channels through which height influences income in China. Our first key finding is that taller people are more likely to become members of the Communist Party,...

This study analyzes one-leader and multiple-follower Stackelberg games with private information regarding demand uncertainty. In the equilibrium of the Stackelberg games, a leader's private information becomes public information among followers. This study demonstrates that the strategic...

Following Barbera, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, Econometrica 59, 595-609), we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable...

Conflict can cause negative externalities to arise, and this can result in economic loss. Such externalities are also thought to influence individualsf perceptions about economic issues. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) provide their hypothesis that the political elite extend the franchise to avoid...

This paper uses Japanese data which includes measures of self-declared satisfaction, reference-group income, and the direction and intensity of income comparisons. Relative to Europeans, the Japanese compare more to friends and less to colleagues, and compare their incomes more. The relationship...

We investigate the incentives for facility-based firms to invest in infrastructure upgrades and to foreclose service-based firms. We focus on asymmetric regulation regarding service-based firms' access to the infrastructure held by a facility-based firm. Spillovers from the infrastructure...

While political correctness is a dominant norm in many public situations, we also observe behaviors that are apparently ''politically incorrect,'' often from professionals and experts. This paper examines the flip side of political correctness as analyzed in Morris (2001) to shed some light on...

Using an overlapping generations model, this paper describes interactions between naive and sophisticated hyperbolic discounters in general equilibrium. The naifs, who overestimate their future propensity to save and hence over-forecast the future equilibrium asset prices, are exploited through...

We examine stability of competitive equilibrium in an N-country world economy with capital accumulation, where each country can have either increasing marginal impatience (IMI) or decreasing marginal impatience (DMI). The necessary and sufficient condition for stability is shown as positive...

Using an overlapping generations model, this paper describes interactions between naive and sophisticated hyperbolic discounters in general equilibrium. The naifs, who overestimate their future propensity to save and hence over-forecast the future equilibrium asset prices, are exploited through...