This paper observes in which way working hours as well as effort respond to a wage increase and we have full control regarding theworkers´ anticipation of the wage increase.

During the last two decades economists have made much progress in understanding incentives, contracts and organisations. Yet, they constrained their attention to a very narrow and empirically questionable view of human motivation. The purpose of this paper is to show that this narrow view of...

A substantial number of people exhibit social preferences, which means they are not solelymotivated by material self-interest but also care positively or negatively for the material payoffs ofrelevant reference agents...

Most economic models are based on the self-interest-hypothesis that assumes that all people are exklusively motivated by their material self-interest. In recent years experimental economists have gathered overwhelming evidence that systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis and...

This paper examines the determinants of informal sanctions by a large number of experiments.

This paper underlines that reciprocity has powerful implications for many economic fields. [editors EconBiz].

This paper provides an experimental evidence indicating that incentivecontracts may undermine voluntary cooperation.

In this paper we show that reputation formation in endogenously formed relationships is a decisive determinant for the existence and performance of credit markets. In theabsence of any third party enforcement of debt repayment the contracting parties succeed in establishing stable bilateral...

While the debate on how economic agents form expectations and how these expectationsshould be modelled has been key to modern macroeconomics, money illusion has been ananathema to macroeconomists until recently. The rational expectations revolution in the1970's thoroughly banned the study of...

For decades economists have considered money illusion aslargely irrelevant. Here we show, however, that money illusion haspowerful effects on equilibrium selection. If we represent payoffs innominal terms almost all subjects play at or close to an inefficientequilibrium whereas if we lift the...