The literature on license auctions for process innovations in oligopoly assumed that the auctioneer reveals the winning bid and stressed that this gives firms an incentive to signal strength through their bids, to the benefit of the innovator. In the present paper we examine whether revealing...

We analyze whether incentives from relative performance pay are reduced or enhanced if a department is possibly terminated due to a crisis. Our benchmark model shows that incentives decrease in a severe crisis, but are boosted given a minor crisis since efforts are strategic complements in the...

Earlier studies show that contracts under subjective performance evaluation are dichotomous and punish only worst performance. I show that with limited liability payments need not be binary. More importantly, if the agent earns a rent from limited liability, the optimal contract distinguishes...

This chapter surveys the theory of international tax competition and coordination, which, matching the increasing policy importance of the topic, has grown substantially over the last 30. years. It focuses on the taxation of capital income, stressing that issues arise not only in relation to...

The standard contest model in which participants compete in a single dimension is well understood and documented. Multi-dimension extensions are possible but are liable to increase the complexity of the contest structure, mitigating one of its main advantages: simplicity. In this paper we...

We study equilibrium in a multistage race in which players compete in a sequence of simultaneous move component contests. Players may win a prize for winning each component contest, as well as a prize for winning the overall race. Each component contest is an all-pay auction with complete...

The formation of an alliance in conflict situations is known to suffer from a collective action problem and from the potential of internal conflict. We show that budget constraints of an intermediate size can overcome this strong disadvantage and explain the formation of alliances. © 2009...

Considering several main types of dynamic contests (the race, the tug-of-war, elimination contests and iterated incumbency fights) we identify a common pattern: the discouragement effect. This effect explains why the sum of rent-seeking efforts often falls considerably short of the prize that is...

We consider the properties of perfectly discriminating contests in which players' abilities are stochastic, but become common knowledge before efforts are expended. Players whose expected ability is lower than that of their rivals may still earn a positive expected payoff from participating in...