We explore the stability of imitation in a 1,200-period experimental Cournot game where subjects do not know the payoff … the need for a new theory of how cooperation emerges. …

subjects switch from imitation of the most profitable rival to other behavior that, intentionally or otherwise, facilitates …-shot game. Our results suggest a new explanation for the emergence of cooperation. …

We explore the stability of imitation in a 1,200-period experimental Cournot game where subjects do not know the payoff … the need for a new theory of how cooperation emerges. …

We explore the stability of imitation in a 1,200-period experimental Cournot game where subjects do not know the payoff … the need for a new theory of how cooperation emerges. …

-shot game. Our results suggest a new explanation for the emergence of cooperation. -- Cournot oligopoly ; imitation ; learning … subjects switch from imitation of the most profitable rival to other behavior that, intentionally or otherwise, facilitates … dynamics ; cooperation …

-shot game. Our results suggest a new explanation for the emergence of cooperation. -- Cournot oligopoly ; imitation ; learning … subjects switch from imitation of the most profitable rival to other behavior that, intentionally or otherwise, facilitates … dynamics ; cooperation …

The paper considers a model of imitation in the context of Cournot oligopoly. Purely imitative behavior can lead to an … outcome inconsistent with Nash equilibrium. The question is when we can reconcile imitation with the concept of Nash … equilibrium. The paper extends purely imitative behavior in two ways. First, imperfect imitation is introduced. Second, a random …

players imitate successful opponents. We postulate that players sometimes rely on imitation of successful behavior, and …