This study addresses the role of government in reducing media bias that arises from the demand side. Introducing a public-interest media outlet reduces the equilibrium slants that would otherwise exist under laissez-faire. Subsidy for the truthful report and price regulation are designed to...

This study examines the relative competitiveness of online and physical bookstores. Online bookstores have the advantage of being able to provide a wide range of books while minimizing inventory costs, but customers must wait several days for their books. Physical bookstores allow consumers to...

It is well known that the double marginalization problem in the vertical relation can be eliminated by collusion, but it is undesirable because of the monopoly pricing outcome. This study addresses the role of downstream market competition under symbiotic production and demonstrates that...

This article establishes a 2-sided media market in which readers have heterogeneous beliefs, media outlets choose their reporting biases, and advertisement prices are determined by bargaining between media outlets and advertisers. The authors have shown that the presence of advertisers...

This paper generalizes Hwang and Mai’s (Am Econ Rev 80:567–575, <CitationRef CitationID="CR10">1990</CitationRef>) model to include labor markets and shows that their results are still valid when the difference of inverse demand slopes is large enough, while, when this difference is small, a monopoly firm always chooses the same...</citationref>

d’Aspremont (Econometrica 47:1145–1150 , <CitationRef CitationID="CR7">1979</CitationRef>) showed that a Hotelling (Econ J 39:41–57 , <CitationRef CitationID="CR10">1929</CitationRef>) duopoly model with quadratic transport costs yields maximal differentiation. However, the introducing of an online firm ensures that the duopolist will never be located at the end points of the...</citationref></citationref>

This paper extends Hwang and Mai (Am Econ Rev 80:567–575, <CitationRef CitationID="CR7">1990</CitationRef>) with an intermediate market to discuss the spatial pricing and social welfare. It is shown that the monopoly will always locate at this intermediate market under discriminatory pricing. Under simple mill pricing, the intermediate...</citationref>