We develop a model of strategic networks that captures two distinctive features of interfirm collaboration: bilateral … to invest in R&D, and the architecture of collaboration networks. In the absence of firm rivalry, the complete network …, under strong market rivalry the complete network is stable, but intermediate levels of collaboration and asymmetric networks …

simple model of strategic networks which captures two distinctive features of such collaboration activity: bilateral … stable networks. Our analysis highlights the interaction between market competition and R&D network structure. We find that … circumstances, such asymmetric collaboration networks are also strategically stable. By contrast, if firms operate in independent …

This paper models the formation of R&D networks in an industry where firms are technologically heterogenous, extending … class of symmetric networks, the complete network is the only pairwise stable network, although not necessarily profit or … complete and the partially connected networks are possibly stable, but which network is stable depends on the level of …

We develop a model of strategic networks that captures two distinctive features of interfirm collaboration: bilateral … to invest in R&D, and the architecture of collaboration networks. In the absence of firm rivalry, the complete network …, under strong market rivalry the complete network is stable, but intermediate levels of collaboration and asymmetric networks …

We develop a model of strategic networks that captures two distinctive features of interfirm collaboration: bilateral … to invest in R&D, and the architecture of collaboration networks. In the absence of firm rivalry, the complete network …, under strong market rivalry the complete network is stable, but intermediate levels of collaboration and asymmetric networks …

capacities for their networks, capacities on the private peering links, if they choose to peer privately, and access prices. The …, where we examine pairwise stable and efficient networks. While there are a large number of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria …

capacities for their networks, capacities on the private peering links, if they choose to peer privately, and access prices. The …, where we examine pairwise stable and efficient networks. While there are a large number of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria …

simple model of strategic networks which captures two distinctive features of such collaboration activity: bilateral … stable networks. Our analysis highlights the interaction between market competition and R&D network structure. We find that … circumstances, such asymmetric collaboration networks are also strategically stable. By contrast, if firms operate in independent …