We first show in the context of sequential multi-unit auctions under complete information that a seller’s revenue may increase or decrease as the number of buyers increases, even when the additional bidders win an object. We use data from the Quebec daily hog auction to empirically analyze the...

We analyze the effects of mergers and the introduction of concurrent marketing mechanisms on the seller’s revenue, price trend and efficiency in sequential auctions under complete information with asymmetric bidders. First, we provide conditions for bidders to be strategic when the number of...

Même après plusieurs années d'utilisation, les technologies de céréales génétiquement modifiées (GM) demeurent controversées. En 2003-2004, la Direction du développement et de l'innovation, au sein du ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche du Québec, a financé une enquête...

We analyze sequential second-price auctions under complete information involving two or more bidders with similar decreasing marginal valuations. Krishna (1999) designed a 2-bidder numerical example to show the existence of two symmetric equilibria characterized by an asymmetric allocation and...

We analyze sequential second-price auctions under complete information involving two or more bidders with similar decreasing marginal valuations. Krishna (1999) designed a 2-bidder numerical example to show the existence of two symmetric equilibria characterized by an asymmetric allocation and...

French Abstract: Même après plusieurs années d'utilisation, les technologies de céréales génétiquement modifiées (GM) demeurent controversées. En 2003-2004, la Direction du développement et de l'innovation, au sein du ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche du Québec, a financé...

We first show in the context of sequential multi-unit auctions under complete information that a seller's revenue may increase or decrease as the number of buyers increases, even when the additional bidders win an object. We use data from the Quebec daily hog auction to empirically analyze the...